The State shall, in order to ensure the appropriate implementation1 of the research, development, and utilization of AI-related technologies, establish guidelines2consistent with the principles of international norms3 and take4other necessary measures5.
This article refers to Japan’s Act on the Promotion of Research, Development, and Utilization of AI-Related Technology (Act No. 53 of 2025). Although sometimes described internationally as “Japan’s AI Act”, the statute differs substantially from the EU AI Act. Rather than establishing a comprehensive hard-law regulatory framework centred on prohibitions, conformity assessments, and administrative sanctions, the Japanese statute is better understood as a promotion-oriented framework law combining industrial policy, administrative coordination, and soft-law governance.
Article 13 may initially appear relatively modest. It neither creates direct obligations for private actors nor establishes an independent regulatory authority. There are no penalties, licensing systems, mandatory conformity assessments, or detailed compliance procedures. Indeed, from the perspective of jurisdictions accustomed to command-and-control regulation, the provision may seem notably restrained.
Yet this restraint is itself revealing.
The provision occupies an important place within Japan’s broader approach to AI governance. Rather than constructing an immediately coercive regulatory structure, the statute positions the Japanese state primarily as a coordinator of governance expectations. The central mechanism is not direct enforcement, but the gradual organisation of administrative guidance, soft-law standards, industrial coordination, and alignment with emerging international governance discussions.
This is consistent with a broader administrative tendency within certain areas of Japanese governance. Japanese regulatory systems have often relied not solely upon formal prohibition, but also upon structured coordination between ministries, industry associations, technical experts, and regulated actors. In practice, much of the operational substance of governance emerges not only from statutes themselves, but from guidelines, interpretive documents, administrative expectations, and iterative consultation processes.
This should not, however, be understood as suggesting that contemporary Japanese regulation is uniformly non-coercive. In several fields — particularly data protection, financial regulation, and competition law — formal enforcement mechanisms have expanded considerably in recent years. The AI Act nevertheless reflects a policy area in which coordination-oriented governance remains especially visible.
Particularly noteworthy is the phrase “guidelines consistent with the principles of international norms”. The provision does not simply authorise domestic rulemaking. Rather, it situates Japanese AI governance within a broader international normative environment shaped by discussions surrounding instruments such as the OECD AI Principles, the G7 Hiroshima AI Process, UNESCO recommendations, and emerging European regulatory approaches.
At the same time, one should be cautious not to overstate the legal effect of the provision. Article 13 does not directly incorporate international standards into domestic law. Nor does it create immediately enforceable obligations upon developers or deployers of AI systems. Instead, it establishes administrative authority and political legitimacy for future coordination efforts.
In this respect, the provision perhaps reveals an important feature of contemporary Japanese governance culture: the preference, within certain emerging policy domains, for adaptive administrative steering rather than immediate juridification. The state preserves room for policy evolution while simultaneously signalling normative direction to industry and society.
Article 13 therefore operates less as a conventional regulatory command than as an institutional bridge — connecting international AI governance discourse, domestic administrative coordination, and Japan’s longstanding preference for consensus-oriented implementation.
The phrase “tekisei na jisshi” (適正な実施) is translated here as “appropriate implementation” rather than “proper enforcement” or “sound operation”. The Japanese term “tekisei” (適正) frequently appears in administrative and regulatory statutes, but often carries a broader connotation than strict legality. Within Japanese governance practice, it commonly implies conduct that is socially acceptable, technically responsible, and administratively coordinated. The term therefore functions less as a sharply defined legal threshold than as a normative administrative standard.
“Shishin” (指針) is translated as “guidelines”, though the institutional significance of the term within Japanese administrative law deserves careful attention. Japanese ministries frequently govern through non-binding guidance documents, recommendations, interpretive standards, and administrative notices. While such instruments may lack formal binding force, they can nonetheless exert substantial practical influence through licensing relationships, procurement practices, industry coordination, and reputational expectations. In practice, Japanese governance has often operated through this intermediate zone between purely voluntary conduct and formally coercive regulation.
The phrase “kokusaiteki na kihan no shushi ni sokushita” (国際的な規範の趣旨に即した) is particularly revealing. The wording does not require strict conformity with international rules, nor does it formally incorporate external standards into domestic law. At the same time, it suggests a form of normative alignment stronger than mere reference or awareness, yet more flexible than strict legal conformity. This drafting technique reflects a characteristically Japanese approach to preserving administrative discretion while signalling consistency with international governance expectations.
The formulation “kōzuru mono to suru” (講ずるものとする) is also significant. Although often translated literally as “shall take measures”, the phrase does not necessarily indicate a directly enforceable legal duty in the Western public-law sense. Within Japanese policy legislation, particularly framework statutes directed at governmental actors, the expression commonly functions as a strong legislative expectation or policy mandate while leaving substantial discretion regarding the concrete form, timing, and intensity of implementation.
The expression “sonota no hitsuyō na shisaku (sesaku)” (その他の必要な施策) “other necessary measures” is intentionally open-ended. Japanese framework statutes frequently employ such language in order to preserve administrative flexibility for future policy development. The provision may therefore support a wide range of future actions, including sector-specific guidance, public-private coordination mechanisms, research support programmes, procurement standards, or voluntary compliance frameworks, without requiring immediate legislative amendment.
Disclaimer
This article is provided solely for academic, informational, and comparative-law purposes and does not constitute legal advice.
Any English translations of Japanese statutes appearing in this article are unofficial translations prepared by the author for research and commentary purposes. In the event of any inconsistency, the original Japanese text shall prevail.
The views expressed are analytical observations regarding legal and institutional structures and should not be understood as political advocacy or governmental interpretation.
